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1. Introduction
Understanding consumer choice behavior under uncertainty is a central issue across a range 
of social sciences. Following Kahneman and Tversky’s (1979) and Tversky and Kahneman’s 
(1992) pioneering work, a large literature has shown that individuals evaluate economic 
outcomes not only according to an absolute valuation of the outcomes in question, but also 
relative to subjective reference points. Loss aversion, one of the pillars of prospect theory, 
asserts that losses relative to a reference point are more painful than equal-sized gains are 
pleasant. Yet, despite the overwhelming laboratory evidence,5 relatively few field studies 
document this phenomenon, and the ones that do involve choices in which risk plays a minor, 
even non-existent, role. 
In this paper, we present novel evidence that loss aversion plays a pivotal role in explaining 
how people select their contracts in the mobile telecommunications industry. We use a new 
individual-level panel dataset of approximately 60,000 mobile phone users in the UK 
between 2010 and 2012. Consumers in our sample subscribe to monthly plans with a fixed 
payment component (the monthly rental) that includes several allowances (for call minutes, 
text messages, data usage, etc.). We argue that the monthly rental payment provides a natural 
reference point. If a customer exceeds her allowance, she pays extras fees, called overage 
fees. This customer could save money by switching to a higher, more inclusive, plan. A 
customer could also save money by switching to a lower, less inclusive tariff if her 
consumption is systematically lower than her allowance. We conjecture that, in line with loss 
aversion, paying more than the reference point is a more “painful” experience and should 
prompt consumers to switch with higher probability than they would if they could save the 
exact same amount by switching to a lower tariff.6 
A unique feature of our data is the way that savings are calculated. In general, people can 
make mistakes in predicting their phone usage or have a limited ability to compute the 
savings from the many available alternatives, which might generate both biases and inertia. In 
our setting, phone users have registered with a specialist mobile comparison website, and 
customers’ potential savings are calculated by an optimizing algorithm devised by a company 
that is allowed to look into their past bills. Consumers then receive personalized information 
5 For an excellent summary of this evidence, see Camerer et al. (2004). 
6 Kahneman (2003), in his Nobel acceptance speech, similarly observed: “The familiar observation that out-of-
pocket losses are valued much more than opportunity costs is readily explained, if these outcomes are evaluated 
on different limbs of the value function.” 
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on the exact amount they could save by switching to the best contract for them. In other 
words, it can be argued that in our sample, consumers know precisely how much they can 
save by switching to a lower- or a higher-tariff plan. 
Based on this information, we evaluate the within-person changes affecting the likelihood of 
switching contracts over time. We show that potential savings are a significant determinant of 
switching. More importantly, and in line with our loss-aversion conjecture, we find that, 
controlling for savings, switching is six times more likely if the customer was charged 
overage fees.  
The case of the mobile phone industry is of particular interest, as mobile phones are 
ubiquitous and people spend a considerable amount of money on them.7 Our findings are also 
applicable beyond cellular services to many economic settings in which consumers choose 
“three-part” tariff contracts that specify fixed fees, allowances, and payments for exceeding 
the allowances (e.g., car leases, credit cards, subscription services; see Grubb, forthcoming). 
Note that these environments are, almost by definition, uncertain, as there is a random 
element in people’s behavior that determines what is ultimately consumed and charged. This 
uncertainty brings with it an element of risk. 
Placing risk aversion vis-à-vis loss aversion is of economic importance, as, in many real-life 
environments, the potential of both gain and loss is most likely to co-exist with risk. In 
situations of choice under uncertainty, prospect theory first foregrounded the importance of 
loss versus gain, whereas expected utility theory typically assumes a uniform attitude towards 
risk. Although a large body of literature has focused on assessing the relevant merits of the 
two theories (e.g., Rabin, 2000; Fehr and Göette, 2007), to the best of our knowledge, no one 
has attempted to account for both with field data. We believe that this is important, as we do 
not see loss aversion and risk aversion as antagonistic, just as we do not necessarily see loss 
aversion and traditional expected utility theory as mutually exclusive. In principle, they can 
both help us understand the determinants of choice. Given the appropriate data, it becomes an 
empirical question to test whether the predictions from either theory are consistent with the 
data, as well as the extent to which they can help predict observed behavior. In this study, we 
do not assume or impose constraints on our consumers but, rather, allow both risk and loss 
aversion to affect their choices.  
7 In the UK, mobile revenues have been stable at over £15bn ($23bn) per year over the past decade. This 
corresponds to about £200 ($300) per year per active subscriber. See Ofcom (2013). 
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Testing for the influence of both, we actually find that risk aversion cannot explain 
consumers’ switching, as traditional expected utility theory would suggest, whereas loss 
aversion remains strong and significant under all specifications examined. We also find that 
individuals seem to be risk-averse in the domain of gains and risk seekers in the domain of 
losses: this differential risk attitude, resulting in an S-shaped behavior of their value function, 
is consistent with prospect theory.8 
Our work is related to a large empirical literature on consumer search and choice behavior. 
Five key aspects distinguish our work from earlier studies.9 First, we use actual consumer- 
level information from a large sample of consumers in an advanced economy.10 
Second, the leading mobile price comparison site in the UK calculates the savings, and each 
consumer receives personalized information via email. Thus, in our environment, customers 
should suffer significantly less from “comparison frictions,” as in Kling et al. (2012), who 
show that simply making information available does not ensure that consumers will use it.  
Third, we test for loss aversion in an environment in which uncertainty is not fixed. Existing 
work typically establishes an asymmetric attitude between gains and losses either when 
choices are riskless (the example of the “endowment effect”)11 or in environments in which 
uncertainty is excluded as an explanation of observed behavior because it is held constant 
throughout the experiment. For example, Fryer et al. (2012) present evidence of loss aversion 
by fixing the mean and variance and exposing subjects to choices between losses and gains in 
a field experiment in education. Teachers were shown to have better results when faced with 
a compensation program that initially presented them with a bonus that was taken away if 
targets were not met (loss) than when facing the same average compensation and same 
8 Genesove and Mayer (2001) observe that house market prices are more flexible upward than downward, which 
implies that sellers’ reservation prices are less flexible downward than buyers’ offers. They suggest that the 
sellers’ reservation price depends on the purchase price of their house (reference point). Sellers with an expected 
selling price below the purchase price set a reservation price that is higher than the price set by sellers who do 
not incur losses. This is also what we find in our data.  
9 There is a large body of literature summarizing the main theories of individual decision making in psychology 
and economics. Rabin (1998), DellaVigna (2009), Barberis (2013), Kőszegi (2014) and Chetty (2015) provide 
excellent reviews of the evidence in the field. 
10 In related work, Jiang (2012) uses survey data from the US, whereas Grubb (2009) and Grubb and Osborne 
(2015) use data from a student population only. 
11 The “endowment effect” is the observation that experimental subjects, who are randomly endowed with a 
commodity, ask for a selling price that substantially exceeds the buying price of subjects who merely have the 
possibility to buy the commodity (see, e.g., Kahneman et al., 1990; Knetsch, 1989). List (2003, 2004) questions 
the robustness of this effect, demonstrating that experienced dealers are much more willing to exchange an 
initial object they are given for another one of similar value. However, Kőszegi and Rabin (2006) argue that 
List’s results may be fully consistent with prospect theory, and more recent research tries to explore this 
hypothesis further (Ericson and Fuster, 2011; Heffetz and List, 2014). 
5 
variance that awarded them a bonus only if targets were met (gain). Similarly, Pope and 
Schweitzer (2011) show that professional golfers react differently to the same shot when they 
are under par than when they are over. Although this clearly provides evidence of asymmetric 
reaction to loss, golfers over par do not face a more uncertain environment than those under 
par, so loss aversion cannot be tested alongside risk aversion. Our environment offers a 
natural interpretation of loss-gain asymmetry, and, furthermore, variance can be easily and 
naturally measured through bill variability to provide an index for testing risk’s contribution 
to consumer choice. In other works, authors have taken stances in favor of one or the other, 
while arguing that alternative explanations would not be realistic in the setting they study. 
For example, Cohen and Einav (2007) estimate risk aversion in insurance and argue that 
alternative preference-based explanations are not relevant in their context, while Ater and 
Landsman (2013) study retail banking and base their approach on loss aversion, reasoning 
that risk plays a minor, possibly non-existent, role. 
Fourth, we analyze a context in which switching can ensure rather large monetary savings. In 
related research, Ater and Landsman (2013) analyze customers’ switching decisions after 
observing the overcharges on their previously held plans in a retail bank. They find that 
customers who incur higher surcharges (losses) have a greater tendency to switch, a finding 
that we also share. However, despite the large estimated effect of surcharges, the absolute 
monetary value in their case is very small compared to average consumers’ income or 
savings. Moreover, their data do not allow them to distinguish between classic risk aversion 
and loss aversion: it is possible that customers with risk aversion choose systematically 
higher plans than needed and switch more rarely. Most importantly, although Ater and 
Landsman (2013) calculate potential savings ex post, it is not likely that customers 
themselves know or could easily calculate the level of savings before their switching 
decision. So it is possible that customers with overage react to what they perceive as a 
savings opportunity, which customers with usage that falls below their allowance cannot 
easily detect or calculate. In this, our framework is drastically different. Our customers are 
explicitly informed about their potential savings by an expert company that they have chosen 
to register with. So they are fully aware of their potential savings when they make their 
switching decisions. Asymmetries cannot be attributed to misconstruing overage as a greater 
savings opportunity.  
Fifth, we study telecoms in a mature phase of the industry. We expect customers in our 
sample to have considerable experience in searching and selecting among operators’ tariffs, 
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given that mobile penetration has exceeded 100% of the population since 2004 in the UK,12 
and that mobile operators have tried and tested their pricing schemes to optimize profits in a 
highly competitive industry.13 
In this paper, we concentrate on understanding the determinants of consumer switching. We 
do not attempt to evaluate the optimality of consumers’ decisions and refrain from making 
welfare claims.14 Therefore, though closely related, our application of behavioral economics 
to cellular phones is different from the extant literature on overconfidence and flat-rate bias.15 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the UK mobile 
communications industry and describes the consumer-switching problem. Data are presented 
in Section 3, while Section 4 introduces the empirical strategy. Results are discussed in 
Section 5, alongside several robustness checks. Section 6 concludes. 
2. The industry and the consumer decision process
2.1 Mobile communications in the UK 
Mobile communications in the UK are provided by four licensed operators: Vodafone, O2 
(owned by Telefonica), Everything Everywhere16 and the latest entrant, Three (owned by 
Hutchison). They all provide their services nationally. In 2011 (midway through our sample), 
there were 82 million mobile subscribers among a population of 63 million. These 
subscribers were split 50:50 between pre-paid (pay-as-you-go) and post-paid (contract) 
customers. The latter typically consume and spend more than the former. 
12 Hence, we differ, e.g., from Miravete (2002), who considers the early days of the US cellular industry, and 
from Jiang (2012), who also uses early data to simulate policies introduced later. 
13 Our paper is also related to recent literature that has exploited rich data from cellular companies to analyze a 
wide range of issues, such as optimal contracts (Miravete, 2002), consumer inertia (Miravete and Palacios-
Huerta, 2014), as well as competitive dynamics and the impact of regulation (Economides et al., 2008; Seim and 
Viard, 2011; Genakos and Valletti, 2011). 
14 We have no information on the tariff recommended by the comparison website, and, hence, we cannot 
evaluate whether customers followed that advice or chose some other tariff. 
15 Using cellular contracts, Lambrecht and Skiera (2006), Lambrecht et al. (2007) and Grubb and Osborne 
(2015) discuss how, in the presence of mistakes related primarily to underusage, the consumers’ bias might be 
systematic overestimation of demand and could cause a flat-rate bias. Were mistakes due primarily to 
overusage, the consumers’ bias might be systematic underestimation of demand, consistent, instead, with naive 
quasi-hyperbolic discounting (DellaVigna and Malmendier, 2004). 
16  Everything Everywhere was formed after the 2009 merger between Orange and T-Mobile (owned by 
Deutsche Telekom). 
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The industry is supervised by a regulator, the Office of Communications (Ofcom). The 
regulator controls licensing (spectrum auctions) and a few technical aspects (such as mobile 
termination rates and mobile number portability), but, otherwise, the industry is deregulated. 
Operators freely set prices to consumers. The four operators have entered into private 
agreements with Mobile Virtual Network Operators (MVNOs) to allow them use of their 
infrastructure and re-branding of services (e.g., Tesco Mobile and Virgin Mobile). These 
MVNOs typically attract pre-paid customers and account for less than 10% of the overall 
subscriber numbers (and less in terms of revenues). 
Post-paid tariff plans are multi-dimensional. They include a monthly rental, a minimum 
contract length, voice and data allowances, and various add-ons and may be bundled with a 
handset and various services. Pre-paid tariffs have a simpler structure. 
As in other industries, there have been concerns about the complexity of the tariffs and the 
ability of consumers to make informed choices. Ofcom, however, has never intervened 
directly in any price setting or restricted the types of tariffs that could be offered.17 Instead, 
Ofcom has supported the idea that information should let consumers make better choices, as 
consumers are more likely to shop around when there is information available with which to 
calculate savings from switching tariff plans. The regulator has, therefore, awarded 
accreditations to websites that allow consumers to compare phone companies to find the 
lowest tariffs. In 2009, Billmonitor.com (henceforth BM), the leading mobile phone price 
comparison site in the UK, was the first company to receive such an award for mobile phone 
services, and its logo appears on Ofcom’s website.18  
Based on Ofcom’s (2013) report, the annual switching between operators (churn rate) varies 
between 12% and 14% for the years 2010-2012. There is no publicly available data on 
within-operator switching, as this is private information held by operators. In the BM sample, 
we observe that some 23% of the customers switch contracts within-operator at least once 
annually during the same period. Although the BM sample consists only of post-paid 
customers that, on average, consume and spend more, we will demonstrate that it has a very 
good geographic spread across the UK and closely matches mobile operators’ market shares 
17 In the UK, this has instead occurred in the energy and banking sectors. For price controls in the UK energy 
sector, see https://www.ofgem.gov.uk/ofgempublications/64003/pricecontrolexplainedmarch13web.pdf. For 
price controls in the banking sector, see Booth and Davies (2015). 
18 http://consumers.ofcom.org.uk/tv-radio/price-comparison/. It is important to note that Ofcom emphasizes the 
independence of these websites. In the BM case, there is no conflict of interest between the advice that they 
provide and the choice that consumers make, as the site neither sponsors nor accepts advertising from any 
mobile provider. 
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and consumer tariff categories, indicating that it is representative of contract customers rather 
than prepaid phone customers. Even with this caveat in mind, the high within-operator 
switching suggests that this is an important and heretofore underappreciated source of 
switching that can be very informative for understanding consumer behavior. 
2.2 The consumer decision process 
Upon users’ registration with the website, BM attains access to their online bills. BM 
downloads past bills, calculates potential savings for the user, 19  and then informs the 
consumer of these potential savings. The process is repeated monthly, as shown in Figure 1. 
On a typical month t, the bill is obtained on day s of the month. BM logs on to the user’s 
mobile operator account and updates the user’s bill history. It uses the updated history to 
calculate potential savings, which it then emails and texts to the user. Thus, on day s, the 
consumer receives her bill, followed by an email and a text from BM with potential savings 
based on her usage history and the current market contract availability. BM also recommends 
a new plan to the customer. The consumer decides whether to act on the information (switch 
= 1, don’t switch = 0), with no obligation to choose the recommended plan. The decision is 
reflected in next month’s (t + 1) bill. On day s of month t + 1, the consumer receives her new 
bill. Then, the savings for month t + 1 are calculated and communicated to the consumer, 
who then decides whether to stay with her current plan, and so on. Thus, the switch decision, 
eventually observed at time t + 1, is based upon usage and savings information collected and 
sent to the user at t. 
BM allows registration only to residential customers with monthly contracts, who are 
typically the high spenders with more complex tariffs. Two features are immediately relevant 
for our purposes. First, despite their complexity, all tariffs are advertised as a monthly 
payment, with various allowances. The monthly payment becomes a relevant reference point 
for the consumer. We call this anticipated and recurrent monthly payment R, though the 
19 In order to calculate savings and suitable contracts, BM builds possible future call, text and data usage 
scenarios for each customer, based on past usage. Using an advanced billing engine, cost is calculated for 
different possible usages for all available market plans. The plan that minimizes the customer’s expected cost is 
chosen, controlling for the variance of bills. The cost for the chosen plan is then contrasted with the cost under 
the consumer’s current plan to obtain savings. All savings recommendations are made with respect to the users’ 
stated preferences at the time they register (e.g., operator, contract length, handset). To protect the intellectual 
property of BM, the full details cannot be disclosed. 
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customer may end up paying more than this amount if she exceeds her allowances or uses 
add-ons not included in the package. In this case, the actual bill, which we denote by B, is 
greater than R. Second, BM calculates the cost of alternative contracts and, given the 
expected consumer behavior, picks the cheapest contract for the particular consumer and 
informs her about it. If C is the cost of the cheapest contract, as calculated by BM, the 
message that BM sends the user should be informative in at least two respects. First, the 
customer is directly told the total value of the savings she can make – that is, Savings = B – 
C. Second, the customer is prompted to see if there have been fees for extras not included in 
in the monthly bundle and if she has exceeded the allowances. This is called “overage” in the 
cellular industry and happens when B > R. 
In Appendix A, we present snapshots of some key moments of the customer experience with 
BM. 
3. Data description and summary statistics
For our analysis, we combined four different datasets obtained from BM20 into a single one 
with more than 245,000 observations that contain monthly information on 59,772 customers 
from July 2010 until September 2012. For each customer-month, we have information on the 
current tariff plan (voice, text, data allowance and consumption, plus the tariff cost), the total 
bill paid and the calculated savings. 21 
Given that the data come from a price comparison website on which consumers freely 
register, it is important to examine the representativeness of our sample (see Appendix B for 
details). 22  We compare observable characteristics of the BM sample with available 
information on UK mobile users. As noted earlier, BM allows only monthly-paying 
customers to register, so we do not have information on pay-as-you-go mobile customers. 
20 The four datasets are: the accounts dataset, which contains an anonymized account identification code for 
each customer who registers with BM, together with her codified phone number and current operator; the bills’ 
dataset, which contains information on the tariff cost, total cost and characteristics of the plan in each month (for 
example, voice, texts and data allowance); the usage dataset, which contains itemized information of every bill 
in each month; and the savings dataset, which provides details on the information sent by BM on how much the 
customer could save by switching to the best available tariff for her. 
21 We do not have information on the suggested tariff plan, which is, however, observed by the user. 
22 All contracts are single-customer contracts, and we do not observe business contracts – i.e., a single entity 
owning multiple phone contracts. 
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First, looking at the geographic dispersion, the distribution of our customers closely matches 
that of the UK population in general (Appendix Figure B1). 
Second, the operators’ market shares also match quite accurately. The only exceptions are 
Everything Everywhere, which is slightly overrepresented in our sample, and Three (the 
latest entrant), where we have a smaller market share in our data compared to data available 
from the regulator (Appendix Figure B3). 
Third, in terms of average revenue per user (ARPU), we have overall higher revenues, which, 
of course, can be explained by the fact that we have only post-paid customers. Otherwise, the 
ranking of the operators is roughly equivalent (Appendix Figure B5). 
Fourth, we have a good representation of customers in different tariff plans. We can compare 
our sample with the aggregate information available from Ofcom on the percentage of 
customers in each segment. The only category that is underrepresented in our sample is the 
lowest tariff plan, which is, perhaps, reasonable given that there is reason to believe that 
customers who register with BM are those on larger tariff plans, as they can make bigger 
savings (Appendix Figure B6). 
Finally, according to Ofcom information, customers in our data send 50 more text messages23 
and talk slightly more24 than the average consumer, which also explains the higher ARPU. 
Overall, it seems that our sample has a very good geographic coverage of the UK and is in 
line with the aggregate market picture of operators and tariffs. The customers in our data 
seem to be heavier users, but the overall picture is representative of the post-paid (contract) 
segment in the UK.25 
3.1 Sample summary statistics 
In this section, we highlight some of the most interesting aspects of consumers’ behavior in 
our sample, related to savings, overage and switching. 
23 Based on Ofcom (2013), the average number of SMS per month was 201, whereas in the BM dataset, 
customers sent 251. 
24 Based on Ofcom (2013), the average minutes per month were 207, whereas they were 235 in the BM dataset. 
25 We do not have information concerning the age or mobile experience of customers. When we control for the 
number of months that we observe each customer in our data, a proxy for contract tenure, the coefficient is not 
significant, indicating that, at least within our sample, “experience” does not make any difference for savings. 
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Savings 
A unique aspect of our data is the savings information calculated by BM. A customer can 
save money (positive savings) by switching to either a lower or a higher tariff plan, 
depending on her consumption. However, a customer might also have negative savings – that 
is, the customer would pay more under the best alternative contract than under her current 
contract: no better deal is available. Figure 2 plots the distribution of monthly savings. The 
majority of customers have positive savings (73%), with the average being £14 and the 
median being £11. 
When conditioning savings on some observable characteristics, we find that female 
customers have no different savings than men. Likewise, customers throughout the various 
UK geographic regions have similar levels of potential savings, reflecting the fact that all 
operators are present nationwide (Appendix Figure B2). Additionally, customers across all 
operators can save, with some small significant differences among them (Appendix Figure 
B4). 
An interesting phenomenon is the fact that savings increase significantly as one moves to 
higher tariff plans, ranked in different brackets by monthly rentals, following the definition of 
Ofcom (Appendix Figure B7). 
Overage 
Overage is very common: 64% of the customer-months in the BM sample experienced it. If 
one looks at the actual difference between the bill and the recurrent tariff cost (B – R), then 
the average amount of overspending is £15, with the median being £7. These figures are large 
when compared to the average monthly bill, which is £25 in our sample. Overage is common 
across genders, different UK regions, and mobile operators. Also interesting is that overage 
does not exhibit any particular relationship with different tariff plans and even customers 
with negative savings experience it (55% of observations with negative savings have 
overage). Overage is very common, not only because it is caused by consuming over and 
above one’s current tariff allowance, but also because mobile operators charge their 




For data availability reasons, we examine switching only across different tariff plans offered 
by the same operator. This is important for two reasons. First, it is relatively easier to switch 
within-operator compared to switching across operators. Customers can change tariffs with 
the same provider without paying penalties if they switch prior to the expiry of the contract. 
Thus, we can be less worried about contractual clauses that we do not observe. Second, 
within-operator switching is an important source of switching in the mobile industry – as 
reported earlier, in our data, 23% of customers switch within-operator annually. Hence, this 
setting is ideal for unraveling frequent consumer choices, though the limitation is that we 
cannot say much about industry-wide competitive effects. 
The average in-sample probability of switching is 0.080 per month, with women switching 
more often than men (0.083 vs 0.077, p-value = 0.0002). Switching is equally distributed 
across the UK. 
Looking at the savings distribution (Figure 3), switchers (before switching) have higher 
savings than non-switchers (£9.3 vs £7.3, p-value = 0.000), and their distribution also has a 
fatter right tail. So savings seem to be one of the factors triggering the decision to switch.  
Finally, it is worth noting that consumers who had overage on their last bill are also more 
likely to switch (0.083 vs. 0.075, p-value = 0.000), indicating that overage might also play a 
role in switching behavior. Table 1 reports some key sample summary statistics.26  
4. Empirical framework
To analyze consumer switching behavior, we use the following econometric framework: 
		ℎ = β + βOverage + βSavings + d + d + ". (1) 
26 Due to the use of lagged values in our estimation framework, we lose the first observation of each consumer, 
as well as a number of consumers who register for only one month. 
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The switching probability for individual i at month t depends on two critical pieces of 
information retrieved at time t – 1 from BM: Overage is a binary variable indicating whether 
the total bill was higher than the tariff reference cost in a given month (Overage = 1(B, R), 
where 1(·) is an indicator function taking the value of 1 if B > R, and zero otherwise); and 
Savings is the monthly savings calculated by BM and communicated to the customer. Notice 
that we correct for unobserved heterogeneity by extensively controlling for fixed effects: # 
captures customer fixed effects, while #	represents time (joint month-year) fixed effects. 
Thus, we control for unobserved differences across customers and unobserved time trends 
and shocks. Finally, "  is the error term that captures all unobserved determinants of the 
switching behavior. Our main interest is in the parameter $	that describes the impact of 
overspending last month on the probability of switching now, controlling for the amount that 
could be saved. 
We estimate (1) using mainly a linear probability specification and calculate the standard 
errors based on a generalized White-like formula, allowing for individual-level clustered 
heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation (Bertrand et al., 2004). We also estimate a simple and 
a conditional (fixed effects) logit model. Although such a model is better suited to the binary 
dependent variable, it is not ideal for our purposes, as the more appropriate FE logit model 
can be estimated only on a subsample of individuals with variation in the switching variable – 
i.e., those who switch at least once during the period in which we observe them. This is a 
nonrepresentative sample and would overestimate the true marginal effect of the independent 
variables. We provide these results to show the qualitative robustness of our results. 
In addition, we also use a proportional hazard model (PHM) for the duration between the 
time a consumer registers with BM and the time of tariff switching. We estimate (1) utilizing 
a semiparametric estimation procedure that allows for time-varying independent variables 
(Cox, 1972). According to the Cox PHM, the hazard function is decomposed into two 
multiplicative components: ℎ, & = ℎ × ( , where ( ≡ exp	$′&. The ℎ is the 
baseline hazard function that models the dynamics of the probability of switching (hazard 
rate) over time; & is a vector of individual characteristics, and β is a vector of regression 
coefficients that includes the intercept; ( scales the baseline hazard proportionally to reflect 
the effect of the covariates based on the underlying heterogeneity of consumers. The main 
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advantage of the PHM is that it accounts for censoring27 and is flexible enough to allow for 
both time-invariant (e.g., mobile operator) and time-varying control variables (e.g., savings). 
5. Results
The main regression results are reported in Tables 2 and 3. Starting with Table 2, when 
considered individually, both overage and savings are important in determining a switching 
decision (columns 1 and 3, respectively). This result is robust to controlling for time and 
individual fixed effects (columns 2 and 4, respectively), and the coefficients actually 
increase, indicating that unobserved individual or common factors are biasing the initial 
estimates downward. 
Column 5 reports the results of the full specification when both overage and savings are 
included in the regression. Although we control for savings, overage still has a large and 
statistically significant coefficient. Interestingly enough, both variables retain their previously 
estimated magnitudes, indicating that the processes of savings and overage are orthogonal to 
each other. More importantly, the economic impact of overage is stronger than that of 
savings. A £10 monthly savings increases the expected probability of switching by only 
0.23%, whereas if a customer’s monthly bill is higher than her tariff, the probability of 
switching increases almost sixfold, to 1.32%. 
Results are qualitatively unchanged when we use a logit model given the binary nature of the 
dependent variable. Column 6 reports the estimated coefficients and column 7 the odds ratios. 
Both estimated coefficients are positive and significant, but a one-pound increase in savings 
increases the odds of switching by 0.6%, whereas overage increases the odds by 7.8%.28 
Finally, the last two columns present the estimated coefficient of the switching hazard model. 
Again, we find that both overage and savings significantly increase the probability of 
switching (column 8), where an additional pound of savings increases the hazard of switching 
by 0.3%, whereas overage increases the hazard of switching by 9% (column 9). 
27 Both right censoring since our sample stops at September 2012 and left censoring since consumers join BM at 
different points in time. 
28 Results using a conditional (individual fixed effects) logit model are even stronger: a one-pound increase in 
savings increases the odds of switching by 0.8%, whereas overage increases the odds by 18.3%. If we control 
for individual fixed effects, the logit approach takes into consideration only the customers who experience 
switching, so it restricts the sample in such a way that it is not comparable with the other regressions. For this 
reason, Table 2, column 6 reports the results without individual consumer fixed-effects. 
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Hence, results from all different estimation models lead to interesting insights regarding 
customer switching among plans. Our findings suggest that, if a consumer is reminded that 
her plan is suboptimal – that is, if she could save by switching to another tariff – then the 
higher the savings, the more likely it is that the customer will switch.29 This is not particularly 
controversial and follows from basic economic reasoning. More intriguing, though, is that 
whether a customer has experienced overage payments, over and above savings, also matters 
considerably. These customers are also more likely to switch to new tariff plans.  
Our results are, therefore, potentially supportive of loss aversion or, more generally, about 
mental accounting theories, which occur when individuals group expenditures into mental 
accounts and do not treat money as fungible across categories. In our setting, customers treat 
fixed monthly payments and overage payments as separate mental accounts, which are 
associated with different levels of utility. Customers construct reference points based on such 
monthly fees and distinguish between within-budget savings and overage losses. We find that 
customers prefer avoiding losses to obtaining gains – indeed, the central prediction of the 
theory of loss aversion. 
Apart from confirming an asymmetric attitude towards gains and losses, the data also allow 
us to test two other key aspects of the way consumers choose. First, we test how loss aversion 
fares when considered together with risk aversion in explaining consumer behavior. We do so 
because the variability in a consumer’s bill is readily calculable, so including variability as an 
explanatory variable tests its contribution to her choice. Second, we test whether there is an 
asymmetric attitude towards risk in the domain of gains versus the domain of losses, another 
key feature of prospect theory. 
To test the extent to which risk aversion might be a factor driving the observed behavior of 
mobile telephony customers, we introduce a measure of the variability of payments that is a 
good proxy for the importance of fluctuations in payments. More specifically, we construct a 
new variable, Bill Variance, which is the variance of the last three bills of a given customer.30 
This variable then becomes an additional control in our main equation. Table 3 reports the 
29 Consumers switch to both higher and lower tariffs. Of those switching, approximately 55% switch to a lower 
tariff plan, whereas 45% switch to a higher tariff plan. 
30  Denote the monthly bill as - . Then, we calculate the average of the last three months, 
./ = -0 + - + - 3⁄ , and, hence, the Bill Variance is equal to 
34 = [-0 −./
 + - −./
 + - −./
] 3⁄ .
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results:31  column 1 estimates a simple OLS regression to test the effect of variance on 
switching. The coefficient of variance is not statistically significant. Column 2 repeats the 
exercise, controlling for consumer and year-month fixed effects. Variance is now negatively 
associated with switching, implying that consumers exhibit an appetite for variance (they 
tend to change contracts with higher variability more rarely).32 Column 3 examines the effect 
of overage and savings on switching for the same customer-months. The results obtained in 
Table 2 remain unchanged. 
Having separately examined the effect of overage and variance on switching, we now include 
both in column 4. The effects of overage and savings remain unaffected; they are still highly 
significant and positive. The effect of variance, however, is no longer significant, implying 
that variance cannot account for the observed customer switching. Bill variance is not 
statistically significant, and does not change previous results in any significant way. While, in 
principle, both loss aversion and risk aversion could play a joint role in a switching decision, 
we do not find a role for risk aversion, just for overage payments. 
Interestingly, although bill variance is not statistically significant, its interaction with overage 
is (column 5). Customers with overage switch significantly less as their bill variance 
increases. Hence, consumers in our sample exhibit a risk-loving attitude in the domain of 
losses (remember that, for overage customers, the bill exceeds their contract tariff and is 
experienced as loss relative to the reference point). On the contrary, customers with no 
overage are risk-averse, as they switch more often as variance increases. This is in line with 
the familiar S-shaped value function from prospect theory, whereby individuals are risk- 
averse in the domain of gains and risk-loving in losses. 
5.1 Alternative interpretations and robustness 
In this section, we test the robustness of our results in relation to alternative interpretations of 
our findings and to measurement and econometric modeling issues. 
31  Due to the lagged three-month moving average calculation, we lose some 74,192 customer-month 
observations. 
32 As we explain later, consumers exhibit risk aversion in the domain of gains but an appetite for risk in the 
domain of losses. When considering how risk affects switching uniformly (that is, in both domains), the latter 
effect seems to dominate. 
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1. Sample selection due to risk aversion. Loss aversion coexists with uncertainty in our
environment. Overage payments can be seen as unexpected payments that customers try to 
avoid. Although we find that bill variance does not affect the probability of switching, in such 
an uncertain environment, the degree of risk aversion may still be a factor that could drive the 
results in a different way: risk-averse customers may select over-inclusive plans to avoid 
fluctuations in their payments. If the information about overage is related to such 
fluctuations, these customers then may also be more likely to switch, other things equal. 
To investigate this, we divide the sample among small (0 <savings ≤ 3), medium (3 < savings 
≤ 11), and large savings (11 < savings ≤ 35).33 Customers that fall in the small savings 
bracket are actually very good at predicting their behavior and do not select large buffers 
(otherwise, BM would also find large savings for them). Those who have large savings may, 
instead, choose large buffers because of aversion to risk. Yet, as columns 1, 2 and 3 of Table 
4 indicate, overage is always significant for all these customers, even though they may differ 
in several other ways. Results in column 1 are particularly telling: customers with very small 
savings do not react to the information that they have some small potential savings. 
Nevertheless, once they are informed about overage, even these customers switch contracts 
with a higher probability.34 Comparing columns 1, 2 and 3, we note that the magnitude of 
overage decreases as savings increase. At the same time, the coefficient of savings is not 
significant for those who have small potential savings (indicating that these customers are, 
indeed, making cost-efficient choices); however, it is positive and very significant for the 
medium bracket and positive and significant, but smaller in size, for the large savings 
bracket.35 Hence, as savings increase, loss aversion continues to play a significant, role but 
the magnitude of its effect is smaller than that of savings. 
2. Overage intensity. Next, we look again at the magnitude of overage. Specifically, we
consider the actual amount by which a bill is higher than the monthly reference tariff, and we 
split the overage observations above and below the median. Table 4, column 4 shows that the 
higher the overage, the more likely it is that the consumer will switch, while still controlling 
33 Cut-off points correspond to the 10th and 90th percentiles of the savings distribution. Results are robust to 
alternative cut-off specifications. 
34  For customers with small savings, consumption matches their chosen plans closely. Small consumption 
shocks (positive or negative) can push them either above or below their allowances, so overage in this case can 
be thought of as quasi-randomly allocated across these consumers. Results are very similar if we use a 
symmetric savings range of -3 < savings ≤ 3. 
35 The coefficient on savings increases in magnitude, compared to the main results in Table 2 for the overall 
sample since we now condition on positive savings. 
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for the magnitude of savings. This seems to indicate that it is not just overage, but also its 
magnitude, that play an important role in pushing consumers to switch. The higher the 
“shock” associated with overage, the more likely consumers will be to switch to a different 
tariff.  
3. Contract constraints. Recall that, when consumers register in BM, they are asked to
express their preferences related to the operator that they want BM to search, as well as the 
features they are interested in (e.g., a special handset). If a consumer does not select anything, 
then BM looks at the universe of available tariffs. Switching between operators can be more 
difficult than switching within an operator, as there may be additional costs involved. In 
Table 4, column 5, we select consumers who explicitly include their current operator in their 
search. As one can see from the number of observations, the vast majority include their 
current operator, so savings must be informative. The results clearly do not change. In 
column 6, we adopt a more conservative approach and restrict the analysis to those customers 
who select only their current operator. In this case, savings must indicate that the best 
alternative contract is with their operator and, hence, must be much more informative. Even 
with this restriction, the results still hold. 
4. Placebo test: negative savings. As a placebo test, we also examine the behavior of
consumers with negative savings. These customers currently have plans with very good 
tariffs since BM cannot find cheaper alternatives. However, even these consumers can 
experience an overage (55% of the observations of customers with negative savings have 
experienced overage), as a total bill is very often the consequence of various extra charges 
unrelated to the tariff bundle. But these customers, precisely because their savings are 
negative, should not be triggered to take a closer look at their bills, and, as a result, they do 
not notice overage. Hence, we would not expect these customers to react either to their 
savings or to their overage information. In Table 4, column 7, we find that both coefficients 
are not statistically significant. 
5. Differences in reactions. Another possible interpretation of our findings is that consumers
who over-consume behave differently than those who under-consume. In particular, one 
could argue that consumers who over-consume and experience overage can respond only by 
adjusting their tariff, whereas consumers who under-consume can adjust either their 
consumption or their tariff. Hence, probabilistically, consumers with no overage are less 
likely to switch. We find this explanation unappealing for three reasons. First, there is no 
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clear a priori reason why consumer who under-consume can adjust their consumption more 
easily than consumers who over-consume. In principle, both can alter their calling behavior 
when they receive the relevant information from BM. Second, for those consumers in the 
small savings bracket that we analyzed earlier (Table 4, column 1), the differences between 
under- and over-consumers are very small, yet overage continues to play a significant role. 
Third, the argument above would imply that since most of the switchers are over-consumers, 
the direction of the switching should be for people to increase their tariffs. However, what we 
observe is that 58% of the consumers who switch choose a lower tariff, while the remaining 
42% switch up, which, again, cannot be reconciled with the above argument. This holds true 
also for consumers in the small savings bracket, (50% switch up and 50% switch down), 
showing once again that risk aversion alone cannot explain switching behavior. 
6. Learning. Finally, a variant of the above argument is that consumers learn about their
optimal bundle by starting with a low tariff plan that they subsequently increase. Thus, the 
positive coefficient on overage actually captures the consumer’s learning process and not loss 
aversion. We also find this explanation unconvincing in explaining switching. First, we study 
UK consumers’ behavior in a mature phase of the telecoms industry. Hence, although we do 
not have information on their age, it is highly unlikely that all these customers are first-time 
users, unaware of their needs and consumption pattern. Second, if the learning hypothesis 
were true, then we would expect the direction of switching to be, on average, upwards, and 
this increase to be more evident the lower the tariff category. However, as we argued earlier, 
consumers switch to lower tariffs, on average (58% vs 42%), and this tendency actually 
increases as we move to lower tariff categories (see Figure A1 in the Appendix). 
Next, we consider alternative econometric specifications and also experiment with alternative 
measures for some of the key variables. First, controlling for Bill Variance does not alter any 
of the previous results, irrespective of the estimation method or sample selected. In Table 3, 
column 4, we showed that the coefficient on Bill Variance was not statistically significant 
and did not affect the size and statistical significance of overage or savings. This continues to 
be the case, even if we apply the logit model or the Cox PHM as alternative estimation 
methods (Table A1, columns 1-4). Moreover, controlling for Bill Variance does not alter the 
results on the saving brackets of Table 4, columns 1-3. Using the same framework, but now 
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controlling for Bill Variance, provides qualitatively very similar results (Table A1, columns 
5-7). 
Second, one could argue that if there is measurement error in calculating savings, then their 
coefficient would be biased. Similarly, including just last months’ savings may be a more 
noisy measure of the true potential savings a customer could achieve. To alleviate these 
concerns, we recalculate savings for each customer using a moving average of her last three 
months and re-run our baseline results from Table 2. None of our previous results changes in 
any fundamental way, while the impact of overage increases slightly (Table A2). 
Third, we also experiment by calculating an alternative measure of variance based on 
savings. Savings measure consumption variability and, as such, it might be useful to capture 
fluctuations in calling behavior. Estimated results are very similar to those previously 
obtained (Table A3 replicates the analysis in Table 3). 
The picture that emerges from this evidence is one in which customers respond, possibly 
sequentially, to the information received from BM. If the message says that the customer is 
already on a plan with a good tariff (negative savings), the customer does not have any 
incentives to look deeper into her consumption pattern, and she stops there. If, instead, the 
customer receives notice that savings are possible, then she is inclined to look much closer at 
her behavior and at the contract. This is when she learns about overage, on top of savings, 
which then initiates the switching patterns that we described above. The consumer perceives 
overage as a loss, irrespective of the savings, and, thus, is much more likely to switch 
contracts. 
Our results support prospect theory: we found loss aversion to be significant in determining 
consumers’ choice to change plans, but we did not find bill variance to be a determinant of 
their choice. Consumers who could reduce losses by a certain amount relative to their salient 
point (monthly tariff) changed plans significantly more than consumers who could improve 
(gain) by the same amount without having experienced overage. We have established that the 
asymmetry between losses and gains can explain observed consumer behavior but that a 
uniform attitude towards risk in both losses and gains (an assumption central to expected 
utility theory) cannot explain customers’ switching. Consumers’ attitude towards risk was 
found to be in line with prospect theory: our consumers exhibit an appetite for risk (bill 
variance) when they are in the loss (overage) domain.  
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6. Conclusions
We have conducted an assessment of consumer behavior using individual data from UK 
mobile operators collected by a price comparison website. We showed that consumers who 
receive reminders about possible savings do respond and switch tariff plans. More 
interestingly, we also discussed how consumers employ their monthly fixed payment as a 
reference point in their choices. When they spend above this reference point, the resulting 
overage payment induces considerable switching. This central finding is very much in line 
with the Loss Aversion model of Kahneman and Tversky (1979) and is robust to several 
alternative interpretations and specifications.  
We were also able to weigh how both risk and loss-aversion considerations affect choices in 
mobile telephony in a modern western economy: this is a high-stake industry affecting the 
majority of the population everywhere in the world. We find that risk aversion cannot explain 
consumers’ switching, while loss aversion plays an important role. 
Our results put the use of price-comparison sites in a new light. Regulators and competition 
authorities worldwide oversee price accreditation schemes for third-party price-comparison 
sites covering several industries – in addition to mobile phones – that still exhibit 
considerable uncertainty in patterns of consumption over time (e.g., banking, credit cards and 
insurance). The aim of these schemes is to increase consumer confidence about how to find 
the best price for the service they wish to purchase, and to increase market transparency by 
providing or facilitating expert guidance. Thaler and Sunstein (2008) propose the RECAP 
(Record, Evaluate, and Compare Alternative Prices) regulation that would require firms to let 
customers share their usage and billing data with third parties, such as BM, which could, in 
turn, provide unbiased advice about whether to switch to a competing provider.36 
The emphasis of these proposals is almost invariably on savings – e.g., finding the most cost-
effective tariff given a certain consumer profile. While this information is certainly useful for 
choice, we also show that savings are only a part of the story, and possibly a minor one. 
Hence, we introduce a note of caution on expert advisers that is different from any conflict-
of-interest consideration (Inderst and Ottaviani, 2012) or from cases in which nudging may 
have adverse market equilibrium effects (Duarte and Hastings, 2012; Handel, 2013). We 
suggest that regulators hoping to rely on price-comparison engines to discipline market prices 
36 Without implying that nudging is always welfare-increasing 
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using shared data should first investigate what giving good advice means in a context with 
loss aversion. Consumers also switch for behavioral reasons that have little to do with 
savings, but that still could be consistent with optimal individual behavior. 
In this paper, we have limited our analysis to the positive implications of behavioral 
economics – namely, on predicting switching behavior in the presence of loss aversion. 
Understanding the effect on social welfare is equally important. In particular, consumer 
switching is central to any competitive assessment of an industry. Developing a non-
paternalistic method of welfare analysis in behavioral models is, however, a challenge. 
Following Chetty (2015), one possibility is to use revealed preferences in an environment in 
which agents are known to maximize their “experienced” utility (their actual well-being as a 
function of choices), which may differ from their “decision” utility (the objective to be 
maximized when making a choice).37 The approach used in our setting is that the amount of 
savings is calculated mechanically by an optimizing algorithm; thus, most behavioral biases 
should vanish or at least be kept to a minimum. The fact that we still find a considerable role 
played by overage implies that loss aversion is of the utmost importance directly in the 
experienced utility and must be accounted for in any welfare assessment. 
37 An alternative approach is to follow structural modeling that specifies and estimates the structural parameters 
of a behavioral model. Grubb and Osborne (2015) follow this line to discuss the recent “nudge” adopted by the 
FCC (the US telecom regulator) of requiring bill-shock alerts for mobile phones (text messages warning when 
allowances of minutes, texts, or data are reached). They show that providing bill-shock alerts to compensate for 
consumer inattention can reduce consumer and total welfare because, most likely, firms will adjust their pricing 
schedule by reducing overage fees and increasing fixed fees. 
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Appendix A – The consumer experience with Billmonitor.com 
In this annex, we present in various screen shots the consumer experience of registering and 
using BM’s services. BM was created to provide impartial information and to help monthly 
paid mobile phone customers to choose contract that is best for them. BM was first accredited 
by Ofcom in 2009 and still receives accreditation (Figure A1). To safeguard its impartiality, 
BM neither receives advertising from any mobile operator nor allows for any kind of 
promotions on its website. It simply collects all available contract information from all UK 
mobile operators and tries to match each consumer’s consumption pattern with the best 
available tariff. 
FIGURE A1: BM’s OFCOM RE-ACCREDITATION 
When a user visits the BM webpage, she is prompted to register in order to have her bills 
analyzed and to determine “exactly the right mobile contract” for her (Figure A2). 
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FIGURE A2: BM’s HOME PAGE 
If she chooses to have the BM engine analyze her bills, she is led to a page asking for her 
details (mobile operator, phone number, username and password and email), as shown in 
Figure A3. 
FIGURE A3: BM’s ANALYSIS PAGE 
During the analysis of her bill, she is presented with a screen that informs her that BM 
searches through all possible contract combinations to find the “right” contract for her 
(Figure A4). 
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FIGURE A4: BM’s CALCULATION SCREEN 
Upon analysis of her bill, the user receives an email informing her of potential savings. This 
email is repeated monthly, the day after her bill is issued, as described in Figure 1 in the main 
text. Figure A5 shows an example of such an email. 
FIGURE A5: EMAIL SENT TO USERS INFORMING THEM OF POTENTIAL SAVINGS 
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Appendix B – Representativeness of the sample and summary statistics 
In this annex, we discuss the representativeness of our sample and also provide some initial 
statistics on savings within our sample. 
Figure B1 compares the geographic distribution of the population residing in the UK (ONS, 
2011 census) with the customers registered with BM. As the figure shows, BM customers are 
well spread across the UK and match the actual population spread closely.  
FIGURE B1: POPULATION DISTRIBUTION ACROSS UK REGIONS 
Notes: The graph above compares the percentage population distribution across regions in the UK and 
in the BM data. 
Source: UK population distribution based on 2011 census, Office for National Statistics. BM 
population distribution based on the data provided by BM.  
In all these different regions, consumers can realize savings by switching to different tariffs 
(Figure B2). Savings are, on average, positive across all regions, with the highest median 
savings in the North East (£7.2) and the lowest in Northern Ireland (£4). 
Figure B3 compares mobile operators’ market shares in BM data with aggregate market 
information from the Bank of America Merrill Lynch (BoAML) dataset for 2012. Aggregate 
market shares are well tracked in the BM data, with the exception of Everything Everywhere 
(the merged entity of T-Mobile and Orange) that is slightly overrepresented and Three 
(Hutchison), which is slightly underrepresented. These discrepancies can be attributed to the 
fact that aggregate market shares also allocate to the licensed operators market shares of 

































airtime from the main licensed operators (they accounted for 8% of the total market in 2010-
2012, mostly in the pre-paid segment; see Ofcom, 2013). 
FIGURE B2: SAVINGS DISTRIBUTION ACROSS UK REGIONS 
Notes: The graph above compares the savings distribution across different UK regions. 
Source: Based on savings data provided by BM.  
FIGURE B3: MOBILE OPERATORS’ MARKET SHARES 
Notes: The graph above compares the mobile operators’ market shares from BoAML and BM data. 










































































































































Customers across all operators can save, as Figure B4 demonstrates, with small but 
significant differences among them (highest median savings for Vodafone, £7.4, and lowest 
for Three, £4.1). 
FIGURE B4: SAVINGS DISTRIBUTION ACROSS MOBILE OPERATORS 
Notes: The graph above compares the savings distribution across mobile operators. 
Source: Based on savings data provided by BM.  
Figure B5 compares the average revenue per user (ARPU) in the BM sample with aggregate 
information obtained from the BoAML dataset for 2012. Given that BM has only post-paid 

















Vodafone O2 Everything Everywhere 3 (Hutchison)
32 
FIGURE B5: AVERAGE REVENUE PER USER ACROSS MOBILE OPERATORS 
Notes: The graph above compares the mobile operators’ average revenue per user from the 
BoAML and the BM data. 
Source: Mobile operators’ average revenue per user based on BoAML and BM data.  
More interestingly, Figure B6 compares the distributions of consumers belonging to different 
tariff plans from the Ofcom38 and the BM data. The two distributions are very similar, with 
the lowest tariff (£0-£14.99) being the only exemption. 
FIGURE B6: MARKET SHARES BY TARIFF CATEGORY 
Notes: The graph above compares the market shares by tariff category from the Ofcom report and BM data. 
Source: Market share by tariff category based on the 2012 Ofcom Communications Market Report and BM 
data. 
Savings can occur across any tariff category in the BM sample (see Figure B7). 
Unsurprisingly, more savings are available to those customers choosing larger and more 
expensive plans. 













































Finally, if we compare the actual consumption, customers in the BM dataset send slightly 
more SMS (SMS per month: BM 251, Ofcom 201) and talk slightly more (minutes per 
month: BM 235, Ofcom 207) than the Ofcom 2012 report indicates, which also explains the 
higher ARPU. 
Overall, the BM sample has a very good geographic spread across the UK and matches 
mobile operators’ market shares and consumer tariff categories pretty closely. As it consists 
only of post-paid customers, these consumers seem to consume and spend more, on average, 
compared to the aggregate statistics, but without either any particular mobile operator or 
geographic bias. 
FIGURE B7: SAVING DISTRIBUTION ACROSS TARIFF CATEGORY
Notes: The graph above compares the savings distribution across tariffs. 
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FIGURE 2: MONTHLY SAVINGS DISTRIBUTION
Notes: The figure presents information on the monthly savings distribution overlaid with a normal density curve.





































Monthly savings (in GBP)


























Monthly savings (in GBP)
Switchers
Non-switchers
Notes: The figure presents information on the monthly savings distribution of consumers who do not switch (non-switchers) and












Pr(switching)it 0.080 0.271 0 0 0 186,515
Overagei (t –1) 0.644 0.479 0 1 1 186,515
Savingsi (t– 1) 7.409 31.743 -7.440 6.505 25.031 186,515
Bill Variancei (t– 1) 397.516 15366.34 0.039 6.764 295.239 112,323
TABLE 1 - SUMMARY STATISTICS
Notes: The table above provides summary statistics on the key variables used in Tables 2, 3 and 4.
Source: Authors’ calculations based on the the Billmonitor.com data.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)




Dependent variable pr(switching)it pr(switching)it pr(switching)it pr(switching)it pr(switching)it pr(switching)it pr(switching)it
Overagei (t– 1) 0.008*** 0.014*** 0.013*** 0.075*** 1.078*** 0.086*** 1.090***
(0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.020) (0.021) (0.018) (0.019)
Savingsi (t –1) (x 10
3
) 0.188*** 0.235*** 0.230*** 6.179*** 1.006*** 3.317*** 1.003***
(0.039) (0.050) (0.048) (0.720) (0.001) (0.484) (0.000)
Observations 186,515 186,515 186,515 186,515 186,515 186,515 186,515
Adjusted/Within R
2
0.000 0.011 0.001 0.011 0.011
Clusters 34,737 34,737 34,737 34,737 34,737 33,215 34,737
Year-Month FE no yes no yes yes yes yes
Consumer FE no yes no yes yes no no
TABLE 2 - THE IMPACT OF OVERAGE ON SWITCHING
Notes: The dependent variable is the probability of switching to a different tariff plan within operator for consumer i in month t. Standard errors clustered at the consumer level are reported in 
parenthesis below coefficients: *significant at 10%; **significant at 5%; ***significant at 1%.
Source: Authors’ calculations based on the the Billmonitor.com data.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Estimation method OLS FE FE FE FE
Dependent variable pr(switching)it pr(switching)it pr(switching)it pr(switching)it pr(switching)it
Overagei (t –1) 0.015*** 0.015*** 0.016***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Savingsi (t –1) (x 10
3
) 0.154*** 0.156*** 0.164***
(0.042) (0.044) (0.047)
Bill Variancei (t –1) (x 10
6
) -0.004 -0.043** 0.012 0.036*
(0.018) (0.019) (0.022) (0.022)




Observations 112,323 112,323 112,323 112,323 112,323
Adjusted/Within R
2
0.000 0.004 0.005 0.005 0.005
Clusters 21,271 21,271 21,271 21,271 16,494
Year-Month FE no yes yes yes yes
Consumer FE no yes yes yes yes
TABLE 3 - LOSS AND RISK AVERSION
Notes: The dependent variable is the probability of switching to a different plan within operator for consumer i in month t. Standard errors clustered at the 
consumer level are reported in parenthesis below coefficients: *significant at 10%; **significant at 5%; ***significant at 1%.
Source: Authors’ calculations based on the the Billmonitor.com data.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Estimation method FE FE FE FE FE FE FE
Dependent variable pr(switching)it pr(switching)it pr(switching)it pr(switching)it pr(switching)it pr(switching)it pr(switching)it
Description 0<savings<3 3<savings<11 11<savings<35










Overagei (t –1) 0.016*** 0.013*** 0.009** 0.014*** 0.009*** 0.002
(0.006) (0.004) (0.004) (0.002) (0.004) (0.004)
Savingsi (t –1) (x 10
3
) -0.224 4.598*** 2.978*** 0.225*** 0.224*** 0.155*** 0.019
(2.806) (0.837) (0.396) (0.048) (0.047) (0.045) (0.027)
Overagei (t –1) 0.008***
below the median (0.002)
Overagei (t –1) 0.022***
above the median (0.003)
Observations 19,546 51,130 60,757 186,515 183,624 70,324 48,953
Within R
2
0.007 0.007 0.008 0.012 0.011 0.012 0.007
Clusters 9,029 16,494 18,659 34,733 32,708 11,287 14,025
Year-Month FE yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Consumer FE yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
TABLE 4 - THE IMPACT OF OVERAGE ON SWITCHING - ROBUSTNESS
Notes: The dependent variable is the probability of switching to a different plan within operator for consumer i in month t. Standard errors clustered at the consumer level are reported 
in parenthesis below coefficients: *significant at 10%; **significant at 5%; ***significant at 1%.
Source: Authors’ calculations based on the the Billmonitor.com data.
FIGURE A1: SWITCHING DIRECTION SPLIT BY TARIFF CATEGORY
Notes: The figure presents information on the switching probabilities by Ofcom tariff category.




























£0-£14.99 £15-£19.99£20-£24.99£25-£29.99£30-£34.99£35-£39.99 £40+ Total
Switching up
Switching down
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Estimation method Odds ratio Odds ratio Hazard ratio Hazard ratio FE FE FE
Dependent variable pr(switching)it pr(switching)it pr(switching)it pr(switching)it pr(switching)it pr(switching)it pr(switching)it
Description w/out variance with variance w/out variance with variance 0<savings<3 3<savings<11 11<savings<35
Overagei (t –1) 1.169*** 1.166*** 1.176*** 1.174*** 0.019*** 0.015*** 0.009**
(0.035) (0.035) (0.033) (0.033) (0.007) (0.005) (0.005)
Savingsi (t –1) (x 10
3
) 1.007*** 1.008*** 1.005*** 1.005*** 0.171 3.665*** 2.480***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (3.263) (0.939) (0.525)
Bill Variancei (t –1) (x 10
6
) 1.000 1.000 -0.804 0.247 -0.567
(0.000) (0.000) (1.270) (0.300) (0.400)
Observations 112,323 112,323 112,323 112,323 12,726 31,856 33,758
Adjusted/Within R
2
0.000 0.004 0.006 0.004 0.006
Clusters 21,271 21,271 21,271 21,271 5,858 10,372 10,083
Year-Month FE yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Consumer FE no no no no yes yes yes
TABLE A1 - ROBUSTNESS - ALTERNATIVE SPECIFICATIONS
Notes: The dependent variable is the probability of switching to a different plan within operator for consumer i in month t. Standard errors clustered at the consumer level are 
reported in parenthesis below coefficients: *significant at 10%; **significant at 5%; ***significant at 1%.
Source: Authors’ calculations based on the the Billmonitor.com data.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)




Dependent variable pr(switching)it pr(switching)it pr(switching)it pr(switching)it pr(switching)it
Overagei (t –1) 0.016*** 0.160*** 1.173*** 0.165*** 1.179***
(0.003) (0.030) (0.035) (0.028) (0.033)
Savingsi (t –1) (x 10
3
) 0.208*** 0.231*** 0.227*** 7.676*** 1.008*** 5.304*** 1.005***
three month lagged moving average (0.052) (0.058) (0.057) (1.232) (0.001) (1.054) (0.001)




Clusters 21,271 21,271 21,271 21,271 21,271
Year-Month FE no yes yes yes yes
Consumer FE no yes yes no no
TABLE A2 - ROBUSTNESS - ALTERNATIVE MEASURE OF SAVINGS
Notes: The dependent variable is the probability of switching to a different plan within operator for consumer i in month t. Standard errors clustered at the consumer level are reported 
in parenthesis below coefficients: *significant at 10%; **significant at 5%; ***significant at 1%.
Source: Authors’ calculations based on the the Billmonitor.com data.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Estimation method OLS FE FE FE
Dependent variable pr(switching)it pr(switching)it pr(switching)it pr(switching)it
Overagei (t –1) 0.015*** 0.015***
(0.003) (0.003)




Savings Variancei (t –1) (x 10
6
) 0.005 -0.052 0.012
(0.037) (0.036) (0.022)
Observations 112,323 112,323 112,323 112,323
Adjusted/Within R
2
0.000 0.004 0.005 0.005
Clusters 21,271 21,271 21,271 21,271
Year-Month FE no yes yes yes
Consumer FE no yes yes yes
TABLE A3 - ROBUSTNESS - ALTERNATIVE MEASURE OF VARIANCE
Notes: The dependent variable is the probability of switching to a different plan within operator for consumer i in month t. Standard errors 
clustered at the consumer level are reported in parenthesis below coefficients: *significant at 10%; **significant at 5%; ***significant at 1%.
Source: Authors’ calculations based on the the Billmonitor.com data.
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